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Abstract 
The  impact  of  asymmetries  between  partners  on  the  stability  of  R&D  cooperation  is  assessed 
analytically in a supergame setting. Two asymmetric firms  are repeatedly taking sequential R&D and 
production decisions, whereby they coordinate their R&D decisions, in order to maximise joint profits. 
The  asymmetries  are  specified  in  terms  of absorptive  capacity  (i.e.  size  of the  spillovers),  R&D 
efficiency  (i.e.  ability  to  implement  know  how)  and  productive  efficiency  or market  size  (i.e.  net 
demand intercept). 
First of all,  it is  shown that these  asymmetries  may  not  be too large,  in  order to  guarantee that the 
disadvantaged firm  remains  interested  in  joining an  R&D cooperative agreement.  Furthermore, each 
asymmetry is  shown to  make the  advantaged firm more inclined  to  stick to  the  cooperative outcome 
(than  in  the  symmetric  case),  while  the  reverse  holds  for  the  disadvantaged  firm.  Finally,  these 
asymmetries,  when  occurring  simultaneously,  mutually  reinforce  each  other.  All  in  all,  R&D 
cooperation between asymmetric partners will typically be beneficial for the advantaged firm and will 
only be attractive for the disadvantaged firm if the asymmetries are not too large. 
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The profitability and stability of R&D cooperation has already been analysed by a number of 
authors  (e.g.  Dasgupta  &  Stiglitz  (1980),  Spence  (1984),  Katz  (1986),  d'Aspremont  & 
Jacquemin  (1988),  Levin  & Reiss  (1988),  De  Bondt  &  Veugelers  (1991),  Kamien  et al. 
(1992), Veugelers & Kesteloot (1994), Kesteloot & Veugelers (1995»  but most often these 
problems have been studied in a setting of symmetric firms.  A few exceptions include Sinha 
& Cusumano (1991), dealing with the incentives to engage in cooperative ventures in case of 
complementarities, Chaudhuri (1994), focusing on technological asymmetries, and De Bondt 
& Henriques (1995), analysing the impact of asymmetric R&D  spillovers on strategic R&D 
investments. 
A  considerable,  and  growmg,  number  of alliances  are  established  between  asymmetric 
partners  (e.g.  Harrigan  (1988),  Veugelers  (1993».  The  asymmetries  may  relate  to  the 
nationality of firms, to the size of the home market and the degree of productive efficiency: 
e.g. alliances between (large) multinational firms and (small) local partners, to the experience 
with engaging in alliances, to the nature of product market competition among partners and 
between  the  partners  and  the  venture,  or to  the  degree  of technological  competence  and 
efficiency, which may be reflected in the capacity to absorb and integrate own and partners' 
know how,  or to  learn from partners (spillovers). For instance, it is  sometimes argued that 
Japanese firms are better able to  transfer technological know how into marketable products 
than their European or American rivals. 
The impact of partner asymmetries  on  the  profitability  and  stability of R&D  cooperation 
remains largely unexplored in the literature, despite its empirical relevance. Harrigan (1988) 
finds  on  the  one  hand  that  strategic  alliances  between  asymmetric  partners,· possessing 
complementary resources and managerial capabilities, are likely to  be more successful than 
alliances between identical firms. On the other hand, asymmetries may be harmful for venture 
performance,  since  heterogeneity  exacerbates  the  differences  in  how  firms  evaluate  the 
venture's activities (Harrigan (1988». The expected benefits of R&D cooperation, and hence 
their willingness to  participate, may differ between large and small firms.  Small firms  may 
fear being exploited by  large partners. For instance, the  small semiconductor firms  largely 
stayed out of Sematech, a joint US  industry-government research consortium, because of the 
large  membership  dues  and  suspicion  that  the  large  firms  would  dominate  the  research 
agenda (The Economist, April 2nd, 1994). 
Based on  the empirical findings  that partner asymmetries tend to  occur more frequently in 
research alliances than in other alliances (Veugelers (1993», this paper focuses on the impact 
of partner asymmetries on the profitability and stability of R&D cooperation in an analytical 
framework. The incentives for large versus small firms to join a cooperative agreement and to 
stick to  the  cooperative  outcome  are  investigated.  Such  an  analysis  may  lead to  a  better understanding  of  the  geographical,  industry  or  product  settings  under  which  R&D 
cooperation is more likely to occur, or to persist. 
The  problem  is  modelled  in  a  supergame  framework  whereby  two  asymmetric  firms 
repeatedly  take  sequential R&D  and  production decisions,  with  the  R&D  decisions  being 
coordinated in order to maximise joint profits. In  our setting, following the empirical finding 
that research  alliances  occur relatively  more frequently  through  coordination than through 
separate entities  (Veugelers  (1993)),  R&D  decisions  are  coordinated and  firms  undertake 
innovative  efforts  in  their  own  research  lab  and  R&D  coordination  is  sustained by  grim 
trigger  strategies  (Friedman  (1971)).  An  accompanying  paper  (Veugelers  &  Kesteloot 
(1995)) deals with stable cooperation among asymmetric partners in a two-stage setting (one-
time sequential R&D and production decisions) with another form of cooperation, i.e. where 
the two firms face the opportunity of jointly developing a new product by setting up a joint 
venture (i.e. a separate entity), with the alternative being own development. 
FRAMEWORK 
Model structure 
An asymmetric duopoly, where firms produce differentiated products, with constant marginal 
costs c. is envisaged. Demand for their products is: 
I 
p. = a. - bq. - dq.  \i i :;t j = 1, 2 
1  1  1  I  (1) 
where p. (q.) is firm i's price (quantity) and b>O, b ~ I  d I. 
I  I 
Firms can improve their profitability by undertaking investments in R&D, which lower their 
production costs and which may entail positive spillovers on the rival's cost. 
If no R&D is undertaken, unit production costs are c.=A (i=I,2 and A<a.). Production costs 
1  1  J  I 
may be reduced through own R&D efforts, as  well as  through the rival's R&D.  Incremental 
innovations,  yielding  improvements  in  the  production  process,  rather  than  drastic 
innovations, are  envisaged. The importance of the  spillover effect is  captured through the 
parameter B., which reflects the extent of such technological leakage as well as the capacity to 
I 
absorb this externally generated know-how: 
c. =  A  - a.(x. + B.x.) 
I  I  I  I  I  1  I~B~O  (2) 
B.  is  assumed to  be technology-specific and is  exogenous. It reflects the level of automatic, 
I 
uncontrollable  know-how  spillovers.  The  parameter  a.  reflects  the  ability  to  apply  and 
I 
implement know how, i.e. to transfer know how into cost savings. 
Innovative  efforts  involve  diminishing  returns,  specified  as  increasing  marginal  costs  of 
R&D.  Total  R&D costs  are 'tx.'12,  whereby  't is  inversely  related to  the efficiency  of the 
I 
innovation process. 
All of this allows to specify firms' total profits, v., as follows: 
I 
V. =  7t.(q.,q.) -'tx2/2 
I  I  I  1  I 
2 with n:.(q.,q.) =  (p.-c.)q. =  [a.-A.+<x.(x.+B.x.)-bq.-dq.]q. 
I  I  1  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  (3) 
Firm asymmetries 
Our model incorporates size and technological asymmetries between partners. Other forms of 
asymmetries  are  ignored  to  keep  the  model  tractable  (cf.  infra).  In order  to  simplify  the 
notation and to focus on the asymmetries, an s-vector is introduced, whereby the elements of 
the vector reflect the size of the asymmetries. To fix ideas, the 'advantaged' firm is labelled as 
the big (B) firm, whiie its partner is identified as the small (S) firm: 
s" =  <X/<XB 
SB =  B/BB  with  1~ s , SB and s  ~  0 
a  " 
In case all s-parameters are equal to 1, both firms are symmetric. 
(4) 
Size asymmetries in terms of market size (as versus aB)  and in terms of production costs (As 
versus AB ) are reflected by the parameter s ; s  is smaller than one, reflecting that the small 
a  a 
firm faces  a  smaller net demand  intercept than  the  big firm,  which  may  be due to lower 
demand for its product and/or higher production costs. Firms may differ in 'size', because of 
differences in consumer demand for their products, or in initial production costs. The latter 
may  differ  because  of  former  production  and  innovation  experience,  because  of 
organisational characteristics of the firm, ... 
Furthermore, firms  may differ in their technological capabilities, which is  captured by two 
different parameters.  s"  reflects the difference in  R&D efficiency; sad implies  that the big 
firm can better implement all  know how,  or put alternatively transfer any  R&D input into 
R&D outputs (cost savings) than its small partner, e.g. because its R&D process is managed 
more  efficiently,  because  of  a  closer  interaction  between  its  R&D  and  production 
departments,  because it has  accumulated  more  innovation  experience (learning effects)  or 
attracted  better researchers,  because  its  production  infrastructure  allows  to  fit  in  process 
improvements more easily (De Bondt & Henriques (1995)). 
Firms can not only differ in their ability to implement any know how, but also in their ability 
to  assimilate  know  how  from  other firms.  Ss  represents  this  asymmetry  in  spillovers,  or 
absorption capacity;  s8<1  implies that the large firm is  better able to  absorb foreign know 
how, or put alternatively, is better able to  keep its own know how proprietary than the small 
rival, e.g. because of the nature of R&D projects, because of the firm's ability or willingness 
to learn from rivals, or because of luck. 
Strategies 
Firms play this innovation and production game for an infinite number of periods. While an 
infinite horizon is not very plausible, this framework applies also if the game is played for a 
3 finite  number of periods,  but with unknown end date.  Empirical research reveals  that few 
alliances  (only  5%)  determine a fixed  end data when  setting up  an  agreement (Veugelers 
(1993». 
During every period, firms  decide on  R&D and production sequentially. Each  stage of the 
game is thus composed of a two-stage game in R&D and output, which is repeated infinitely. 
In order to focus exclusively on the stability of R&D cooperation, it is  assumed that firms 
want to establish a cooperative equilibrium in R&D only, while they continue to compete in 
output  markets  (Coumot-Nash),  an  assumption  which  can  be  supported  by  antitrust 
legislation. It is  assumed that R&D does not carryover across periods, e.g.  because of the 
speed  of technological  progress  or  short  product  life  cycles,  which  allows  to  apply  the 
supergame framework. 
The  stability  of  such  cooperative  agreements  IS  investigated  in  a  setting,  where  the 
equilibrium is supported by (noncooperative) grim trigger strategies (Friedman (1971». Both 
firms start out in the cooperative phase. If one firm deviates from the cooperative outcome, 
both firms revert to the punishment phase from the next period on, for all remaining periods 
of the  game.  If this  punishment  is  severe  enough,  i.e.  if foregone  profits,  due  to  the 
punishment,  offset the  initial  profit  increment from  deviating,  it  will  prevent  firms  from 
defecting in the first place. Hence, a stable cooperative outcome exists. 
By  sticking to  the  cooperative equilibrium,  firms  realise  cooperative  profits  (ViC)  for  an 
infinite number of periods. The net present value of this flow of profits is V{/(1 +  lIri) , with ri 
the interest rate for firm i. 1 Given that its rival is loyal, a firm may go for maximal profits by 
deviating from the cooperative outcome. Defection profits are indicated by  Vi d  (Vid > ViC). 
Such a defection will be punished, by reverting to the Nash equilibrium, whereby both firms 
. realise punishment profits vt (vt < ViC).  Given that detection and consequent punishment 
are  assumed  to  take  one  period  to  unfold,  the  net  present  value  of profits  realised  with 
cheating are Vid + Vtlri. 
A cooperative outcome will be stable, if the following inequality holds for each firm: 
(5) 
(6) 
If inequality (6)  is  satisfied for each firm  i,  i.e.  if each firm's  interest rate is  lower than a 
certain firm-specific threshold (ri*) a stable cooperative equilibrium exists.2 
Equilibrium 
A scenario of R&D cartelisation (in the terminology of Kamien et al.  (1992»  is envisaged. 
Firms coordinate their R&D investments, but choose their output levels independently. 
I For simplicity, discounting within each two-stage subgame is ignored. 
2 In practice, firms  may choose more severe but temporary punishments.  Since the length of the punishments is 
endogeneous in these models, such punishment structures are not pursued here, to keep the results tractable.  For 
other possible strategies and their (dis )advantages, see Abreu (1986) and Tirole (1988). 
4 In  the second phase of each stage game, firms  choose their output levels independently, in 
order to maximise their own profits. This yields the following first order conditions: 
q. =  Z. + Ax. + Bx  (7) 
1  1  I  I  1  I 
V  i,j = 1,2  it:j 
with Z =  [2b(a.-A)-d(a.-A)]/(4b2-d2) 
I  I  I  J  J 
A =  (2ba.-dB.a.)/(4b2-d2) 
I  I  J  J 
B. =  (2bB.a.-da.)/(  4b2-d2) 
I  I  I  J 
This  same first  order  condition holds  for  any  output  stage of the  game,  i.e.  independent of 
whether firms  cooperate, cheat or compete in  R&D.  Obviously, the corresponding optimal 
output levels will be different, since the R&D first order conditions will differ, depending on 
the stage of the game. 
During the first (R&D) phase of each game, firms determine their optimal R&D levels, taking 
the  optimal output into  account.  During the  cooperative phase of the  game,  firms  choose 
R&D levels in order to maximise joint profits, which yields the first order conditions: 
2bqA - 'Ix. + 2bq.B. =  0  V i,j =  1,2  it:  j  (8) 
I  I  I  J  I 
Given that a rival is loyal (realises its cooperative R&D effort level), a firm may increase its 
profits by deviating from the cooperative innovative outcome. In this case, the defecting firm 
determines its  private optimal. R&D  level,  taking into  account that the  rival  firm is  loyal, 
which yields a FOC for the defector, which is rearranged as follows: 
q. =  'tx.l2bA 
I  I  I  Vi =  1,2  (9) 
For the notation, it was  assumed that i is  the cheating firm,  while j  remains loyal, but with 
asymmetric firms, obviously the cheating incentive must also be adressed from the point of 
view of firm j. 
A  deviation  triggers  the  punishment  for  the  remaining  part  of  the  game.  During  the 
punishment, the noncooperative sequential (Cournot-Nash) equilibrium is established. During 
the  R&D  stage,  both  firms  independently  choose  their  optimal  R&D  levels,  in  order to 
maximise  private  profits.  This  optimisation  problem  yields  a  FOC,  with  an  identical 
relationship between output and R&D  as  in  (9)  - but where  again,  obviously,  the  optimal 
output and R&D levels will be different, since both firms now determine their sales level in 
this way. R&D levels for all states of the game are summarised in appendix. 
Firms will stick to  the cooperative equilibrium when they are sufficiently patient, that is, if 
their interest rate is lower than rj*,  being the maximal interest rate for which the cooperative 
outcome can be sustained with eternal Cournot-Nash punishments by firm i. 
Now, it will be investigated how the partner asymmetries affect the stability of cooperation. 
First it is analysed whether an incentive to cooperate exists for both firms, and if so, whether 
grim trigger  strategies  suffice  to  prevent  the  partners  from  cheating,  i.e.  whether  stable 
cooperation can be achieved. An asymmetry is judged to facilitate cooperation if it increases 
the maximal interest rate for which cooperation can be sustained, compared with a scenario 
5 of symmetric firms. On the basis of these findings, it can be investigated which type of R&D 
partner  (i.e.  which  type  of asymmetry)  is  best  selected  for  succesful  R&D  cooperation. 
Finally,  the  impact  of  different  simultaneous  asymmetries  on  the  stability  of  R&D 
cooperation  is  considered.  Given  the  complexity of the model,  the  results  will  mainly  be 
illustrated  by  means  of  numerical  simulations,  for  each  type  of  asymmetry  separately 
(whereby everything else is supposed symmetric). In each case, the same numerical example, 
with a-A= 100, b=2, d=  1, 1:=2 and varying values for ex,  13,  sa'  sa  and  sn  will be applied.3 The 
findings are compared with the symmetric setting, which was reported elsewhere (Kesteloot 
& Veugelers (1995». 
INCENTIVES TO ENGAGE IN R&D COOPERATION 
In an asymmetric setting, it must be investigated whether each firm has an incentive to join a 
cooperative agreement in the first place, i.e.  (i)  whether cooperative equilibria exist which, 
for  both firms,  yield positive cooperative R&D,  output and  profit  levels  and  (ii)  whether 
cooperation is  superior to  independent conduct, i.e.  whether Vic  >  Yin  for  each firm i and 
whereby obviously vt > O. 
Positive cooperative profits 
For the large firm, the usual economic viability, second order and stability restrictions on the 
parameter  values,  applying  to  the  symmetric  case,  are  sufficient  to  guarantee  positive 
cooperative profits  (VBc>O),  independent of the  magnitude  of each asymmetry,  considered 
separately.  For  the  small  firm,  this  also  holds  in  case  of R&D  efficiency  and  spillover 
asymmetries,  but this  need not be  the  case  with  substantial  size asymmetries,  of which  a 
numerical example is provided in Fig. 1. 
INSERT FIG 1 
For many parameter values of the size asymmetry,  an  asymmetric cooperative equilibrium 
may exist, with both firms innovating and producing.4 However, with large size asymmetries 
(s <0.2 up  to  0.4,  depending on  the  level  of the  spillovers),  the  small firm  would  not be 
a 
willing  to  cooperate,  because  of negative  cooperative  profits  (Vsc<O).  In case of large  -
symmetric - spillovers, cooperation would imply that both  firms  innovate  (XSC,  XBc>O),  but 
would  entail  losses  for  the  small  firm  (VSc+VBc  is  maximised,  with  Vsc<O  and  VBc>O). 
Intuitively, the large market size, together with the large spillovers, implies that joint profit 
maximisation (VSc+VBC)  requires performing much R&D (in order to  reduce unit production 
costs,  mainly  for  the  large  sales  market)  and  performing  these  R&D  efforts  in  the  two 
laboratories in order to  reduce the costs of R&D.5  Obviously, such high  R&D efforts may 
3 The robustness of the results has been checked for other numerical solutions, which are not reported in the paper. 
4 All parameter values imply that xBc, qBC and VBc > O. 
5 This  is  most  easily  seen  when  B=I,  which  implies  that  xSc=xBc, independent of the  magnitude of the  size 
asymmetry. 
6 entail losses for the small firm,  which only serves a small market (high R&D costs but low 
sales profits,  and hence  Vsc<O).  It may even occur that it is  optimal, from this joint profit 
viewpoint, for the small firm not to  produce/sell its product, but only to perform R&D (for 
the  partner market);  i.e.  joint profits  are  basically  maximised  by  serving only  the  largest 
market  (and  thus  avoiding  the  detrimental  competitive  impact  of  the  availability  of a 
substitute)  and  by  spreading  the  R&D  efforts  over  2  laboratories  and  thus  reducing  the 
detrimental impact of diminishing returns in R&D. 
With small spillovers, cooperation would imply that the small firm closes down its facilities 
(joint profit maximisation implies Xs c=O; qs c=O and hence V  s  c=O). In this case the argument of 
beneficial R&D decentralisation (at least for the large firm)  does  not apply, because of the 
limited spillovers. 
Superiority of cooperative over independent conduct 
Besides  positive cooperative  profits,  cooperative conduct  should  additionally  yield  higher 
profits than noncooperative conduct for each firm.  This condition is  necessary to guarantee 
that it is worthwhile to join the cooperative agreement in the first place for each firm. Again 
this condition does not pose particular problems for any asymmetry for the large firm~ but it 
may for the small firm.6 Fig. 2 summarises the possibilities for the above numerical example. 
INSERT FIG 2 
Only with fairly small market size or production cost asymmetries (s  above 0.84 to  0.75, 
a 
depending on the level of spillovers) will the small firm prefer cooperation over independent 
conduct (V  s  c> V  s  fi).  In  case  of more  substantial  size  asymmetries,  independent conduct  is 
superior  basically  since  the  small  firm  does  not  perform  so  much  R&D  (which  mainly 
benefits the large firm in  a cooperative setup). The case of very large size asymmetries (s 
a 
below 0.16 to 0.28 depending on  the level of spillovers) will be ignored for the remaining 
part of the paper, since the small firm would even in a Nash setting, decide to close down in 
order to avoid losses (VSfi<O). 
With asymmetric spillovers,  the  potential profitability of cooperation for  the  small firm  is 
critically dependent on  the level of the large firm's spillover, vis a vis  the degree of product 
differentation  and  the  magnitude  of the  spillover asymmetry.  The critical  spillover rate  is 
BB=da/2baB =ds/2b,  i.e.  where  BB=O,  with  BB  representing  the  slope  of the  big  firm's 
reaction curve, a critical parameter which shows up  frequently in  these models of strategic 
R&D investments.? Hence, cooperation is  potentially beneficial for the small firm (i) in case 
of small spillovers for both firms8 and (ii) in case of high BB'  only if the spillover asymmetry 
is  not too  large (e.g.  s6>0.8,  or even higher, depending on the level of the spillover, in  the 
6 In the razor's edge case of Bi=O for both firms, Vic=Vin, which is an artifact of the model (see also De Bandt and 
Veugelers (1991), De Bandt &  Henriques (1995)). 
7 A  similar critical spillover rate  was  identified  in  symmetric  scenarios  in  De  Bandt &  Veugelers  (1991)  and 
Kesteloot & Veugelers (1995) and in a setup with asymmetric spillovers (De Bandt & Henriques (1995)). 
R If BB  is low, BS  has to be small too, since sB < I. 
7 numerical example).  Intuitively,  if 1\ is  large,  cooperation  involves  a  lot  of R&D,  which 
mainly  benefits  the  large firm and  the  small  firm  will  only  find  cooperation an  attractive 
altemative if it gains quite a lot from coordinating R&D efforts too (i.e. if it absorbs enough 
know how from the rival). If not (low Bs)' the small firm favours independent conduct, which 
implies less R&D. If BB  is  small, cooperation does not require substantial R&D efforts, and 
hence  the  small  firm  will  not  be  better  off  by  determining  its  optimal  R&D  efforts 
independently. 
Similar findings  occur  with  asymmetries  in  R&D  efficiency.  Cooperative  conduct  yields 
higher profits  than  Nash conduct for  the  small firm,  (i)  in  any case,  if spillovers are very 
small for both firms, and (ii) only if the asymmetry in R&D efficiency is not too large when 
spillovers are bigger (e.g. s,,>0.8 if B=l in the numerical example), intuitively, again because 
the small firm has to benefit enough from cooperation (i.e. sufficiently high as compared to 
aB)' Again, the turning point between both areas lies at BB=da/2b. 
Hence, according to this model, in the semiconductor industry, where spillovers may be quite 
large, the small firms would indeed not be interested in joining a cooperative agreement with 
large firms, such as Sematech, because of too low expected cooperative profits. 
STABLE R&D COOPERATION 
For those parameter values for which duopolistic cooperative and noncooperative equilibria 
exist, it is now investigated how each type of asymmetry affects the stability of cooperation, 
taken into account the prevention of deviations by  means of a grim trigger strategy.  Given 
that both firms have an  incentive to join a cooperative agreement (vt > Vi n), it is  analysed 
whether they have an incentive to stick to  the agreement, i.e. whether the immediate benefits 
from  defection  (Vid  >  ViC.  for  one  period)  are  outweighed  by  the  disadvantages  of the 
subsequent punishment (V  in  < ViC.  for all remaining periods of the game), and how this net 
gain from cheating depends on the type and magnitude of asymmetries. This stability issue 
can be discussed easily in terms of the maximal interest rate that is required for firms to stick 
to the cooperative outcome. 
Stability for the small versus the large firm 
Fig. 3 illustrates the evolution of the critical interest rate (ri*) for the big and the small firm, in 
terms of the different asymmetries and the level of the spillovers. 
INSERT FIG 3 
In  case of size asymmetries,  the  big firm  is  less  inclined to  deviate  from  the cooperative 
agreement as its rival becomes smaller (smaller s ) and as symmetric spillovers decrease. The 
a 
reverse holds for the small firm, which is, even with fairly small size asymmetries (s  above 
a 
0.77) not very likely to stick to the cooperative outcome (i.e. its critical interest rate decreases 
8 fast with the asymmetry), intuitively because its own benefits from cooperation are not large 
enough,  which makes cheating more attractive (high  one-time gains  of VSd_Vsc,  combined 
with not so severe punishment - small VSC_VSil,  since Vsc is small). 
With asymmetric spillovers, similar results  hold,  at least when the spillovers  for the large 
firm are quite substantial (i.e. if BB>O,  implying BB>ds,/2b, or put alternatively, if the big and 
small firm's  R&D efforts are strategic complements - cf.  Bulow et al.  (1985». In  this case, 
cooperation is  more and more  likely  to  be  supported by  the  large firm,  as  the asymmetry 
becomes iarger (i.e. Os smaiier) whiie the reverse hoids for the disadvantaged firm. The smaU 
firm experiences quite a strong incentive to perform less R&D than agreed, in order to reduce 
its R&D costs substantially, without affecting its sales drastically (since it can anyway absorb 
know how, from the substantial R&D efforts performed by the large rival). Again, the impact 
of the asymmetry on the magnitude of the gains from cooperation is the driving force behind 
this result. Hence, to the extent that a firm can partially control the level of its own know how 
that its rival can absorb (i.e. its rival's spillover rate), this suggests that the advantaged firm 
should be aware of the fact that unilaterally keeping its know how as proprietary as possible 
(i.e.  enhancing the spillover asymmetry) is  likely to  result in a breakdown of cooperation, 
because its small partner is stimulated into cheating. With modest spillovers for the large firm 
(BB <0, i.e. if for the big firm R&D efforts are strategic substitutes), the results are reversed. 
In this situation, the advantaged firm is more likely to defect as the asymmetry grows larger. 
With low spillovers, cooperative R&D efforts are quite small, and since it does not learn a lot 
from its  small partner,  the  large firm is  tempted to  defect by  performing more R&D than 
agreed, in order to enhance its own sales and profits (more R&D, which does not benefit the 
rival much anyway, because of low BB and S8). 
With asymmetries  in  R&D efficiency,  the stability  issue  can be described along the  same 
lines, since a similar process is at work and is not further discussed here. 
Typically, it is thus the case, at least when spillovers are large enough,  that the large firm 
will be more inclined to stick to the cooperative outcome as  any kind of asymmetry grows 
larger,  i.e. as  its rival becomes more disadvantaged,  while the reverse holds for the small 
firm, intuitively because the large firm has more to gain from cooperation than the small firm. 
For the small firm, the immediate gains from cheating (VSd_VSC) decrease as it becomes more 
disadvantaged,  while the drawbacks from cheating (V s  C  -V  S  il)  decrease even faster with the 
size of the asymmetry for parameter values for which a cooperative equilibrium exists. The 
reverse holds for the large firm, which experiences less incentive to  cheat as  the asymmetry 
grows,  because  the  immediate  cheating  gains  (VB d  -V B  C)  reduce,  while  the  punishment 
becomes relatively more severe (VBC_VB il  increases). 
Since the disadvantaged firm is not very  likely to  stick to  the cooperative outcome for any 
kind  of substantial  asymmetry,  it can  be  concluded  that cooperation  is  not  very  likely  to 
persist between partners that differ drastically in  terms of either (geographical or product) 
9 market size, productive efficiency, absorption capacity or R&D efficiency and this analytical 
finding  is  supported by  the  evidence since ventures  between similar partners  (in terms of 
culture, asset size, venturing experience, ... ) seem to last longer (Harrigan (1988). 
To the extent that the results from our model can be interpreted from the point of view of 
selecting an attractive R&D partner, these results imply that R&D cooperation would better 
be pursued with an advantaged, rather than a disadvantaged partner because such cooperation 
is  more likely to  persist (i.e.  critical interest rate  is  quite  high),  while cooperation with a 
disadvantaged  partner  would  be  more  likely  to  break  down  (or  more  precisely:  not  to 
materialise), because of the attractiveness of cheating for the latter. Hence, if a firm faces a 
choice of several potential partners, a partner with a more favourable position, in terms of 
size,  R&D  efficiency  and/or  absorption  capacity,  would  be  a  better  choice  than  a 
disadvantaged partner, at  least from the point of view of stable cooperation.  This issue of 
stability should be weighed against the gains from cooperation however, since typically an 
individual firm's cooperative profits are higher in  case of cooperation with a disadvantaged 
partner, intuitively, because a more advantaged partner realises larger cooperative profits! 
Sensitivity to the different asymmetries 
It can further be analysed how sensitive the stability of R&D cooperation is  to each type of 
asymmetry. Table I shows how each firm's critical interest rate responds to a given variation 
in each asymmetry (each s-element varying from 0.85 to  1),  in a (numerical) setting where 





Table I: Sensitivity of stable R&D cooperation to asymmetries (cxB=BB=0.8) 
(maximal interest rate in %) 
size asymmetry  spillover asymmetry  R&Deff. asymmetry 
•  *  •  •  *  *  rB  rs  rB  rs  fB  rs 
213  25  223  19  203  11 
163  47  170  43  163  35 
96  96  96  96  96  96 
For the  advantaged firm,  the incentive to  stick to  the cooperative outcome is  more or less 
identical for each kind of asymmetry - in any case its real interest rate will be below its rB" 
but the disadvantaged firm's  optimal  strategy is  more  sensitive to  the  type  of asymmetry. 
Growing asymmetries in  R&D efficiency are most likely to entice the small firm to deviate 
from  the  cooperative  outcome  (largest  decrease  in  rs'  for  a  given  asymmetry),  while 
augmenting size asymmetries are least likely to stimulate the small firm into cheating. All of 
this would suggest that asymmetries in size are less harmful for stable cooperation in R&D 
than asymmetries in R&D efficiency or spillovers. To the extent that 'size' can be interpreted 
as  an industry characteristic, while R&D efficiency and absorption capacity are more firm-
specific,  the  above  finding  would provide an  analytical justification for  Harrigan's  (1988) 
10 observation  that  industry  characteristics  are  far  more  important  for  the  stability  of 
cooperation  than  firm  characteristics.  This  interpretation  should  be  taken  with  caution 
however,  since  it  may  be  that  the  results  are  not  robust,  when  e.g.  partner firms  do  not 
cooperate  only  in  R&D  but  also  in  output  markets,  or  when  the  asymmetries  generate 
synergies among the partners, thereby enlarging the gains from cooperation  .. 
Several asymmetries 
Obviously, if the asymmetries would occur simultaneously, they would reinforce each other. 
s 
*  rB 
*  rs 
Table II: Stability with simultaneous asymmetries 
(maximal interest rate in %) 
0.85  0.9  0.95 
733  400  203 
- - 22 




For a numerical example where the three asymmetries vary  simultaneously from 0.85 to  1 
(i.e.  parameter  values  for  which  a  stable  cooperative  outcome  was  possible  for  each 
asymmetry considered separately), each firm's  critical interest rate was calculated and it is 
obtained that once the asymmetry is larger than 5% in all areas simultaneously (i.e. s  = s  =  a  a 
s6<0.95)  the  small  firm  would  never  stick  to  the  cooperative  outcome.  Hence  R&D 
cooperation becomes infeasible, even  with  small asymmetries in  different areas. Likewise, 
the incentive for the large firm to  stick to  the cooperative outcome is  strenghtened as  the 
asymmetries  occur simultaneously:  rB *  increases  to  733%  when  sa=sa=ss=0.85  whereas  it 
increases to  a little over 200% in case of one asymmetry only - but in each case, the large 
firm is very likely to stick to the cooperative equilibrium (i.e. rB < rB *). 
Scenario 
Table III: Critical discount factor with several asymmetries 
(maximal interest rate in %) 
r* with symmetry  r;* with 5% asymmetry  r/ with 15% asymmetry 
spin-off firm  96  150  285 
.  p~~~~~~  .....................................  ~~  ............................  ~.4  ................................ J.? ............... . 
best researchers firm  96  186  488 









Finally, one partner need not be disadvantaged in  all areas. A size disadvantage can e.g. be 
accompanied  by  an  advantage  in  R&D  efficiency.  For  instance,  a  spin-off firm,  a  small 
enterprise  set  up  by  researchers,  may  not  yet  have  built  a  strong  market  base  (size 
disadvantage), but may enjoy stronger technological expertise both in  applying know how 
11 (advantage in  R&D efficiency)  and in  absorbing external know  how  (spillover advantage) 
than  the partner firm.  In  such  a situation, the numerical simulations show that the spin-off 
firm will be more inclined to  stick to  the cooperative outcome as  all asymmetries increase, 
while the reverse holds for its partner. The stability advantages associated with higher R&D 
efficiency and absorption capacity outweigh the disadvantages of smaller size. 
If one partner is  able to attract better researchers than its rival, this will lead to higher R&D 
efficiency and absorption capacity (higher a  and B).  The advantaged partner, with the better 
reseachers,  win be more inclined to  stick to  the cooperative outcome,  while  its  partner is 
more tempted to deviate as the asymmetry augments (fast decrease in ri*). 
A  locally  operating company  may  consider  R&D  cooperation  with  a  large  multinational 
enterprise. The latter may for instance enjoy a size advantage, while the former may be better 
placed to apply know how, because of its superior information about the local conditions (no 
asymmetries in spillovers assumed). In such a scenario the local (multinational) firm will be 
more (less) inclined to cooperate as both asymmetries grow larger, because R&D efficiency 
asymmetries are more influential than size asymmetries. 
Finally, the analysis also suggests that a scenario whereby  one partner is  disadvantaged in 
several areas vis a vis  its  partner is  much less likely to  result in  stable cooperation than a 
scenario where the asymmetries are distributed across  partners,  which tends  to support the 
empirical finding that cooperation is  much -more  likely to  be  stable between partners  with 
complementary skills (Harrigan (1988)). 
CONCLUSIONS 
When  the  asymmetric  scenario  IS  compared  with  the  symmetric  case,  the  following 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the robustness of the symmetric set up. 
The symmetric  setup  was  sufficiently rich  to  point out the  crucial  impact  of the  level of 
spillovers - vis a  vis the degree of product differentiation - on the gains and stability of R&D 
cooperation. This characteristic, unsurprisingly, also shows up in the asymmetric setting, and 
additionally,  it  was  shown  that  substantial  asymmetries  in  spillovers  may  render  R&D 
cooperation  unprofitable,  at  least  for  the  disadvantaged  firm.  Moreover,  the  numerical 
examples revealed that the critical level of the other asymmetries for which R&D cooperation 
turns out to become more or less attractive is very often related to the degree of spillovers. 
Contrary to the symmetric case, the asymmetric scenario has pointed out the crucial impact of 
asymmetries in market size and/or initial production costs (i.e. the net demand intercept) and 
R&D  efficiency  on  the  expected  gains  from  cooperation.  Whereas  market  size,  initial 
production costs and R&D efficiency only affect the level of profits, but not the stability of 
cooperation  in  a  symmetric  setup,  they  both  have  a  much  more  substantial  impact  once 
asymmetries are incorporated. Large asymmetries (low s  or s ) may lead the disadvantaged 
(l  a 
12 firm to  prefer independent over cooperative R&D conduct and large size asymmetries could 
furthermore result in losses for the disadvantaged firm. 
All in all, intuitively, this simple analytical scenario suggests that R&D cooperation between 
asymmetric  firms  will  typically  be  beneficial  for  the  advantaged  firm,  and  will  only  be 
attractive  for  the  disadvantaged  firm  if the  asymmetries  are  not  too  substantial,  i.e.  if 
cooperation does not benefit its partner too much more than itself. 
Obviously, in order to  achieve a fuller understanding of the impact of firm asymmetries on 
the formation and perfoUllanCe of strategic alliances, much more work still needs to be dOlle. 
For instance, in our model it was assumed that both partners are horizontally related (they 
operate in the same product market), since the empirical research shows that the majority of 
alliances is  established between horizontal partners (e.g.  Ghemawat et al.  (1986), Harrigan 
(1988), Veugelers (1994)). Nevertheless alliances between partners that are vertically related 
or that produce independent products may pose specific problems (e.g.  larger heterogeneity 
and hence coordination costs) and  opportunities (e.g.  no product market rivalry and hence 
less threats to the stability of the cooperative venture) for cooperation, which are worthwhile 
to investigate. 
Furthermore,  in  our  model,  incremental  innovations,  generating  cost  reductions,  were 
envisaged. In  practice, however, a number of innovations have a drastic character and this 
may fundamentally affect the expected profits, but also th  persistence of strategic alliances. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to further investigate the incentives for cooperation aiming 
at the development of new products (e.g.  Chaudhuri (1994)) or at improving the quality of 
exisitng products (e.g.Beath et al. (1987) and Poyago-Theotoky (1995)). 
Also  the incentives for cooperation in other organisational formats,  e.g.  in joint ventures, 
whereby the joint venture's products  may  likewise be horizontally,  vertically or not at all 
related  to  the  parents'  products,  should  be  addressed  separately.  This  was  attempted  in 
another  paper  (Veugelers  &  Kesteloot  (1995)).  In  this  paper,  also  the  impact  of 
complementarities  between  firms,  whereby  cooperation  will  yield  synergies,  is  studied  in 
detail.  It  must  also  be  investigated  to  what  extent  the  results  would  be  altered  if the 
asymmetric  firms  do  not  cooperate  only  in  R&D,  but  also  in  output  markets  (i.e.  full 
cooperation) . 
Finally,  in  practice,  the  partners  may  also  differ  in  their venturing experience  and  hence 
reputation as  an  attractive alliance partner, but fully  investigating this topic would require a 
truly dynamic model. 
13 APPENDIX: EQUILIBRIUM R&D LEVELS 
From the first order conditions for the different stages of the game: 
•  during precompetitive R&D coordination: 
with Zi = [2b(ai-Ai)-d(arAj)]/(4b2-d2) 
Ai =  (2b<Xi-dBp.j)/( 4b2-d2) 
Bi =  (2bBi<Xi-d<Xj)/(4b2-d2) 
•  during cheating by firm i: 
Xi =  2bqA/'t 
•  during the Nash punishment: 
Xi = 2bqA/'t 
\ti,j=I,2  i:;tj 
\t i,j =  1,2  i :;t j 
\t i,j = 1,2  i :;t j 
\t i:::::  1,2 
\t i,j =  1,2  i :;t j 
\t i = 1,2 
the expressions for the equilibrium R&D levels can easily be derived (for i, j =  1,2 and i :;t j): 
c  (AiZi + B'Z-)(tl2b - A-2 - Bi2) + (AiBi + A-B')(A-Z' + BiZi)  xi  =  ____________ 1_1  ___________ 1 ________________________ 1_J  ____ 1_:1  _____________ _ 
('tl2b - Ai2 - Bl)(,r/2b -A/ - Bj2)  - (AjBj + BjAj)2 
d  AiZi  AiBi  c 
X'  =  ---------------- + ---------------- X· 
1  (,t/2b _ Ai2)  ('tl2b - Ai2)  J 
A-Z· ('t/2b - A-2) + A-B·A-Z·  Xi n =  ________  1.._L __________ L  ______ !  __ !  __ L1  _____ _ 
('t/2b - Ai2)('tl2b - Al) - AiAjBiBj 
Equilibrium sales and profit levels can be obtained from these optimal R&D levels. They are 
not reported here, beceause their complex expressions do not provide any additional insights. 
The  second  order  and  stability  conditions  (cf.  Henrjques  (1990»  were  checked  for  all 
numerical examples. 
14 Fig. 1:  Cooperative profits for the small firm, with size asymmetries 
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Fig. 2 (Cont.): Cooperative versus Nash profits for the small firm 
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